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Business groups and network industries
Welcome to the Winter 2014 issue of the Network Industries 
Newsletter, which is dedicated to the topic of “Business Groups 
in Network Industries”. Business groups are generally unders-
tood as collections of heterogeneous companies tied together 
by formal and informal links and are distinguished in the ma-
nagement literature as a unique organisational form differing 
from stand-alone companies. Business groups can be holdings, 
conglomerates or corporate groups and are particularly wides-
pread in the network industries. The winter issue presents three 
articles discussing the functioning of business groups in the 
specific conductions of network industries. Its goal is to pre-
sent the theoretical framework on business groups indicating 
the dimensions of their functioning as well as to confront the 
theory with some practical illustrations and cases. This issue 
also intends to open a wider discussion on the role, benefits 
and shortcoming of business groups operating in Europe and 
worldwide.  
In the first article Maria Aluchna using the examples of four 
cases from Poland discusses the characteristics of business groups 
and indicates the potential benefits they offer to network indus-
tries. The second contribution is delivered by Jana Pieriegud 
who analyses the evolution and organizational forms of corpo-
rate groups in the rail freight sector in Poland focusing on the 
strategies of PKP Cargo Logistics Group and CTL Logistics 
Group are discussed. Finally Miroslav Stojsavljevic in the third 
article presents the example of Serbian water management 
companies acting as a specific business group addressing the 
functioning of public companies dealing with natural resources 
and showing the complexity of this form of economic activity. 
We hope that you find the contribution interesting and 
inspiring for future studies both on business groups and on 
network industries. 
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1. Intorduction
Business groups represent a specific form of econo-
mic activity placed between organizational hierarchy 
and contractual networks. Since they play an important 
role in economies in terms of their contribution to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), employment and investment 
(Avdasheva, 2007; Heugens/ Zyglidopoulos, 2008) they 
remain in the centre of management and finance research. 
Business groups are defined as a collection of compa-
nies tied with mutual formal links of economic, trade, 
ownership and credit character as well as informal links 
such as cultural, personal and religious relations (Yiu et 
al., 2007) and are distinguished in the management lite-
rature from stand-alone companies. Business groups such 
as holdings, conglomerates or financial-industrial groups 
emerged both in developed and developing countries and 
they are often seen as the successful strategy for economic 
and social policies. The analysis of origin and organizatio-
nal form of corporate groups refers to the debate on the 
boundaries of the firm and the scope of ‘make’ or ‘buy’ 
activities. Corporate groups are perceived as a network of 
companies, but their characteristics distinguishes them 
from other types of network structures such as supplier or 
distribution (e.g. franchises) networks, strategic alliance, 
geographic associations.
Since this form of economic activity offers many po-
tential benefits supporting the operation and development 
in the specific environment it is often found in the case of 
network industries. This article briefly introduces the spe-
cificity of business groups, their characteristics and func-
tioning indicating the reasons for the widely adoption of 
the business group form in network industries focusing on 
the potential benefits business groups offer to the collec-
tions of companies.  
2. Growing interests in business groups
Business groups are a separate form of economic acti-
vity and reveal their own specific characteristics (Zattoni, 
1999). The literature delivers a wide range of different 
terms used, such as business groups, groups of compa-
nies, conglomerates, holdings, as well as a richness of 
definitions. A corporate group is usually defined as a set 
of legally separate and independent firms tied with stable 
relationships and operating in strategically unrelated acti-
vities and under common ownership control (Yiu et al., 
2007). However, some definitions refer to a wider more 
general character of ties connecting the company inclu-
ding informal or social relationships such as family ties 
between CEOs or interlocking directories of independent 
firms or administrative or financial control, interperso-
nal trust or related to ethnic or commercial background 
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). This 
wider definition of business groups relates mostly to 
Indian business houses or Japanese keiretsu. On the other 
hand the narrower definitions, which derive from the eco-
nomic aspects of business groups functioning, point at 
relationships between separate firms initiated by a family 
that remains the controlling shareholder. At the same time 
there are strong ownership ties as well as business and fi-
nancial interlocks (Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Fisman 
and Khanna, 2004). Korean chaebol, Latin American gru-
pos, Thai family groups or continental European pyramids 
serve as examples for this narrower perspective. American 
conglomerates usually fit the economic definition however 
reveal different, usually heavily dispersed ownership struc-
ture with no or very small family involvement. 
A model of a corporate group is presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: A model of a business group 
Source: Becht/ Röell (1999:1052).
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Corporate groups, defined as a number of associated 
companies which enjoy ownership ties known as cross sha-
reholdings, contractual (production, service, finance) rela-
tions as well as personal and informal links, often operate 
in network industries. The group companies are intended 
to operate while cooperating with their peers, need to fol-
low group interests and goals as well as to undergo the 
group rules and investment policy. The affiliated compa-
nies also constitute a specific environment for the organi-
sational control and corporate governance ranging from 
network based and stakeholder oriented to hierarchy based 
and shareholder oriented. The identity of the investors in 
the ownership structure and the degree of concentration 
may determine the corporate governance policies and 
frameworks.
Recent years brought increasing interest in business 
groups. The reasons behind the growing interest for re-
search on corporate groups are rooted in three main areas. 
First, corporate groups constitute the dominant form 
of the economic activity in emerging markets and their 
powerful position and influence potential is often seen 
as a crucial element for the success of the economy of 
India, China or Mexico. Corporate groups in emerging 
markets are often perceived as a structure compensating 
for weak institutional order boosting trust and lowering 
transaction cost of economic activity (Khanna and Palepu, 
1998, 1999). Therefore, with the growing international 
economic and political role of developing countries and 
regions, the interest in the functioning of business groups 
has emerged. Secondly, the comparative analysis on corpo-
rate groups reveals many positive aspects stressing benefits 
of synergy, better performance, higher effectiveness in the 
fields of internal market, human resource management 
(HRM), diversification strategies and market position. 
These advantages may become important elements in de-
veloping corporate groups under the condition of a global 
economy where flexibility of separate business units, effi-
cient resource allocation as well as synergy effects of the use 
of intangible resources (reputational capital, know how, 
knowledge, logo, image) may provide essential solutions 
for current environmental challenges. And finally, the la-
test methodological developments allow to use advanced 
statistic and econometric tools controlling for the specifi-
city of the sample companies (endogeneity, characteristics) 
which in turn delivered new findings on groups’ efficiency 
neglecting already elaborated and widely recognized state-
ments and opinions (Villalonga, 2000, 2004; Emms and 
Kale, 2006; Sanzhar, 2006). 
3. Reasons for adopting business group form in 
network industries 
Business groups are built to achieve certain advan-
tages related to the organizational form, specificity of the 
functioning and the synergy potential both in finance and 
management. These reasons become crucial at the begin-
ning of 20th century in line with the processes of industry 
concentration and consolidation in various sectors led by 
the opportunity for additional profits generated from the 
economy of scale and constant cost reduction. Another 
approach refers to the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
transactions and strategies towards vertical integration 
and eliminating the unrelated diversification. Reasons for 
building corporate groups can be summarized as follows 
(Trocki, 2004): 
• economies of scale and scope – business activity wit-
hin a group allows both for standardization and differen-
tiation of products/services. The opportunity for coope-
ration between affiliated firms provides the potential for 
synergy in production, marketing, sales, management, 
finance and HRM;
• focus on core competences and possibility to lower 
the risk – corporate group gives the unique opportunity 
for risk diversification via implementation of a related or 
unrelated diversification strategy allowing for the specia-
lization in narrow areas represented by separate business 
units;
• possibility to overall economic activity optimization 
and encouraging local entrepreneurship – corporate acti-
vity adopts central management as well as it provides inde-
pendence and autonomy for separate business units.
Comparative analysis of business groups and studies 
on their functioning identify a large number of arguments 
supporting the adoption of this form of economic activity 
in general and in network industries in particular. The rea-
sons for adopting the form of business groups are rooted 
in a set of potential benefits it offers for the functioning 
of affiliated companies and refer to positive arguments for 
diversification strategy and market position, organizatio-
nal and functional synergy, efficiency of internal market, 
coordinated corporate governance, potential of internal 
capital market and advantages of HRM. The outline of 
these reasons is presented in Table 1. 
As shown in Table 1 the form of business groups may of-
fer several potential benefits for economic activity, which 
appear to be particularly important for the specific envi-
ronment of network industries. First, the diversification 
strategy, which remains one of the main reasons why 
companies adopt the form of business group, assures for 
a wider scope of operation on different market segments 
that lowers risks, may stimulate growth and in result lead 
dossier
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to a stronger market position. Interestingly, in the litera-
ture still two alternative approaches address the diversifi-
cation strategy. The previously recognized conglomerate 
discount assuming the lower valuation for business groups 
as compared to stand alone firm (Lang and Stulz, 1994) 
appears to be replaced by the competing hypothesis of the 
diversification premium and positive impact of diversifica-
tion on company value (Villalonga, 2000; Graham et al., 
2002). The second argument presented in Table 1 refers 
to the organizational and functional synergy as the pre-
sence of affiliated companies in the group assumes their 
cooperation. This stimulates the use of the group resources 
such as capital, infrastructure, know how, reputation and 
brand, knowledge, customers/suppliers base (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1998). The specificity of business groups functio-
ning includes formation of the so called internal market. 
The internal market offers rules for cooperation, boosts 
coordination and provides development for suppliers 
and customers of certain goods/services. In other words 
group members do not have to engage in cooperation 
with firms outside the group. The internal market also 
improves the execution of contracts and delivers safety 
to mutual contractual relationships (Khanna and Palepu, 
1998). This hypothesis explains the popularity of business 
groups in emerging markets stating that the potential of 
an internal market compensates for the weak institutional 
order and weak legal protection and as a result increases 
trust between group members and lowers the transaction 
costs of economic activity. However, this hypothesis is 
neglected by some authors who did not find statistically 
significant relations between the existence of an internal 
market and quality of institutional order (Heugens and 
Zyglidopoulos, 2008). Business groups, particularly those 
controlled by the majority shareholder such as industry 
investors or the family of the founder enjoy better coor-
dination in the case of dominant shareholder control. 
The group companies are tied not only by the ownership 
links but also through the interlocking directories which 
boost the information flow, experience exchange and the 
mitigation of information asymmetry. The next argument 
provided in Table 1 refers to the functioning of the inter-
nal capital market. The internal market stands for the in-
vestment policy conducted by business groups via the size 
and directions of funds allocated between group members 
(Stein, 1997). The internal capital market takes the form 
of intergroup loans and bond issuance and aims at helping 
dossier
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Table 1: Arguments supporting the use of business group form
Argument Benefits Benefits for network industries 
Diversification stra-
tegy 
It assures for a wider scope of group operation on 
different market segments that lowers risks, stimu-
lates growth and in result leads to stronger market 
position.
It allows to lower risk of capital and 
infrastructure intensive enterprises; 
a stronger position helps to achieve 
stability on the market and to continue 
development. 
Organizational and 
functional synergy
Operation on different market segments and 
cooperation between group companies encourage 
use of the group resources (capital, infrastructure, 
know how, reputation and brand, knowledge, cus-
tomers/ suppliers base etc.).
Important for network industries due 
to high investment in infrastructure 
and the know-how specificity. 
Internal market Sets rules for cooperation, boosts coordination and 
provides development for suppliers and customers 
of certain goods/ services. It also improves the 
execution of contracts and delivers safety to mutual 
contractual relationships (Khanna and Palepu, 
1998).
Important for network industries, 
which require patient long term finan-
cing. 
Corporate governance Better coordination in the case of dominant 
shareholder control (industry investor, family or 
founder), interlocking directories.  
Control over substantial resources 
engaged in network industries, long 
term approach, patient financing, 
know how support. 
Internal capital market Investment policy conducted by business groups 
with respect to funds allocated between group 
members (Stein, 1997). It helps individual com-
panies avoid financing constrains that single, 
independent companies without access to internal 
capital market cannot overcome (Deloof, 1998).
Important for network industries, 
which require patient long term finan-
cing. 
HRM The possibility for employees and executives rota-
tion, exchange of experience, knowledge transfer. 
Important for complex structures and 
specificity of network industries. 
t  4
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individual companies to avoid financing constrains that 
single, independent companies without access to internal 
capital market cannot overcome (Deloof, 1998). The lite-
rature delivers again two alternative hypotheses assuming 
that the internal capital market is more efficient than the 
external market what translates into efficacy of the parent 
company’s investment policy. Groups enjoy lower infor-
mation asymmetry of the parent company, a relatively easy 
allocation process and high managerial motivation within 
the groups (Gertner et al., 1994). The competing hypothe-
sis assumes that the internal capital market is less efficient 
than the external market which means that groups do not 
allocate funds optimally (Lamont and Polk, 2002). This 
stance points at higher costs of collecting information of 
affiliated firm investment plans and non-economic rea-
sons for investment policy within groups (Choe and Yin, 
2005). The last argument for the adoption of the business 
group form indicates the benefits for HRM. As research 
indicates business groups conduct an active personnel 
policy focusing on employees and executives rotation, 
exchange of experience and knowledge transfer. Business 
groups are comprised of several companies, which offers 
a perfect environment for the development of employees’ 
and executives’ careers and understanding of the business 
operation under various conditions.  
Discussing the reasons for adopting the business group 
form in network industries requires taking into account 
some shortcomings related to its functioning. The activity 
within corporate groups is often criticized due to seve-
ral possible shortcomings. First, the diversification stra-
tegy may cause problems referring to inefficient resource 
allocation and lack of adequate knowledge or managerial 
experience in selected sectors. Additionally, current com-
plex and challenging environment may prefer a focused 
strategy based on core competences and targeted market 
segments (Kakani, 2001). Business groups consisting of 
many companies may result in a rigid and complicated 
structure which translates into a lack of flexibility and high 
management and organizational costs. Tracking the profi-
tability of a wide portfolio, HRM requirements towards 
development and compensation policy and problems in 
balancing interests of all shareholders and stakeholders as 
well as SBU managers in company’s corporate governance 
system (higher information asymmetry, increased moral 
hazard) may further lower the overall performance of the 
business group (Weiner, 2005).
4. Business groups in network industries – the 
Polish case
The development of business groups in network indus-
tries in Poland is heavily rooted in the transition reforms 
and the turnaround of the economic system in 1989. The 
conglomerates and holdings dominating the socialistic eco-
nomy based on heavy and network industries were viewed 
as the most efficient structures to provide for the optimal 
use of resources and assure for constant economic growth 
assumed by the central plan. As these groups proved to be 
highly inefficient due to the politically appointed execu-
tives, poor control rights allocation, elimination of mar-
ket competition and exaggerated unrelated diversification, 
their restructuring was placed in the centre of the transi-
tion agenda. Conducting spin offs, adopting more focused 
strategy and consolidating the units led to significant rede-
velopment of these business groups. Simultaneously the 
newly founded companies, mostly in network industries, 
adopted the form of business groups in the process of their 
growth and further expansion. The latest statistical report 
identified 1996 corporate groups in Poland which include 
9823 non-financial companies (GUS, 2010).  The Polish 
corporate groups operate either in the form of a complete 
group with the headquarters in Poland or as a part of the 
international business group with the parent company 
located mostly in other EU countries or the US. 
The case studies of three large business groups ope-
rating in network industries have been analysed for the 
purpose of this article: Orange Polska is the company affi-
liated in the France Telecom group operating in the tele-
communication and information sector; PGE is the largest 
company listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange operating 
in the energy sector combining coal mining, energy gene-
ration and distribution contributing to over 20% of all 
energy supply in Poland; GTC is the construction giant 
with operation in the Central and South East Europe. 
These three business groups have been analysed with the 
reference to the use of the abovementioned arguments. 
The study was based on the analysis of materials included 
in each Group annual report and consolidated financial 
statements as well as combined with a series of interviews 
of business groups’ experts and representatives.    
As shown in Table 2 all three selected business groups 
appear to take advantage of the identified arguments sup-
porting the use of this form of economic activity. The col-
lected evidence indicates that the use of the internal market 
is important but remains limited in the case of dominance 
of the parent company representing 50-70% of the reve-
nues. The use of the internal capital market appears to be 
important as well but is constrained by specific sectorial 
and banking regulation in the case of the construction in-
dustry. Business groups also adopt measures to coordinate 
corporate governance and enjoy significant organizational 
and functional synergy effects. The potential of HRM re-
mains relatively unexplored.  
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5. Conclusion
Business groups reveal their organisational and opera-
tional specificity as well as significant differences in the 
types, which emerged in various countries. The form of 
a business group offers a wide range of potential bene-
fits that affiliated companies can enjoy. These advantages 
appear to be particularly important for companies opera-
ting in network industries which require capital intensive 
investments in infrastructure and rely on the cooperation 
of affiliated units and contractors. Therefore the potential 
of the internal market for products and services as well as 
the internal capital market which offers long term patient 
capital, play important roles for the development of busi-
ness groups. A group of companies operating in network 
industries can also enjoy organizational and functional 
synergies based on the common use of logos, brands, in-
frastructure, customer and contractor base or reputation 
in relations with creditors. The advantages listed in the 
article were illustrated with the case studies of three Polish 
business groups operating in network industries which 
take advantage of the identified benefits although their use 
is constrained by the early stage of development and the 
significant role of the parent company and specific secto-
rial limitations. 
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1. Structural and ownership changes in the Polish 
rail freight market
The Polish railway market is among the largest in the 
European Union. Over the last decade, the institutional 
structure of Poland’s rail sector has undergone a number of 
changes. In 2013, the country’s 19,200-kilometer railway 
network was used by 54 rail freight undertakings and 12 
passenger undertakings. 
The liberalization of the Polish rail freight market 
was formally initiated by the Railway Transport Act of 
1997. In 1998, the Minister for Transport and Maritime 
Economy awarded 22 concessions for freight transport 
services. It was not until April 1, 2002, however, that the 
first network statement and access charges were published 
by PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. (PKP PLK); hence 
the date is commonly seen as marking the effective takeoff 
of the rail freight market opening process in Poland. The 
opening proceeded incrementally in the following years. 
On establishing their presence in Poland, most pri-
vately-owned operators relied on bulk cargo, since their 
productive potential had developed at the beginning of 
the 1990s on the basis of the so-called “mining railways” 
(PTKiGK in Rybnik, PTKiGK in Zabrze, NZTK, Pol-
Miedź-Trans) and “sand railways” (KP Szczakowa, KP 
Kotlarnia, KP Kuźnica Warężyńska, KP Maczki-Bór), 
which had operated for many years in Upper Silesia and 
the adjoining regions, serving the Upper Silesian Industrial 
Area (Paprocki, Pieriegud, 2008). The subsequent years 
saw a number of ownership changes (Table 1) that led to 
private freight operators capturing an increasing share of 
the market. In 2003-2013, the new entrants’ market share 
(based on transport performance) rose from to 4% to 35%. 
Today the biggest players are CTL Logistics Group and 
Lotos Kolej, each with a 7% to 8% market share (Figure 
1). Notably, private undertakings have gained a dominant 
position in the liquid fuels segment – more than 50% of 
fuels that were previously (i.e. prior to 2004) carried for 
the leading oil companies (PKN Orlen and Lotos) by PKP 
Cargo are now carried by specialized operators controlled 
by the oil companies themselves (Lotos Kolej and Orlen 
Koltrans). Petroleum products also represent a substantial 
proportion of freight carried by CTL Logistics Group.
Since 2009, Poland has also experienced the presence 
of operators owned by foreign incumbents that entered 
the Polish market by buying out private undertakings. 
In July 2009, Deutsche Bahn AG took over the PCC 
Logistics Group, and in September that year it acquired 
the PTK Holding Group. The operator is now known as 
DB Schenker Rail Polska. In another instance, the French 
national railways SNCF Fret acquired a stake in ITL 
International GmbH. The acquisition process started in 
2008 and was finalized in 2012. On June 1, 2012, ITL 
Polska Sp. z o.o. officially started operations as Captrain 
Capital Group, being part of the French SNCF-Geodis 
Group. Its share of the Polish rail freight market remains 
below 0.5%.
2. The strategies of the largest corporate groups
The PKP Group (Grupa PKP S.A.) is the second largest 
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This article focuses on the evolution and organizational forms of corporate groups in the rail freight sector in Poland. The strategies of PKP 
Cargo Logistics Group and CTL Logistics Group are discussed.
Figure 1. The Polish rail freight market structure in 2013 (percent 
breakdown based on tonne-km)
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employer in Poland, with a workforce of nearly 85,000, 
and the fourth largest European railway group. It was for-
med in 2001 pursuant to the Act of September 8, 2000 on 
the Commercialization, Restructuring and Privatization 
of the State Enterprise Polskie Koleje Państwowe (Polish 
State Railways). 
PKP S.A., the parent company, holds shares in all of 
the Group’s constituent entities, while being itself owned 
by the state. Besides PKP S.A., the PKP Group is cur-
rently made up of 11 subsidiaries including providers of 
rail transport services (PKP Intercity S.A., PKP SKM w 
Trójmieście Sp. z o.o., PKP Cargo S.A., PKP LHS Sp. z 
o.o.), a railway infrastructure manager (PKP PLK S.A.), 
service providers to the energy and the telecommunica-
tions markets (PKP Energetyka Sp. z o.o., TK Telekom 
dossier
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Railway 
undertaking
Year license 
awarded
Key changes
Operators owned by national railways of other EU states
DB Schenker 
Group
2003 The Group emerged as a result of takeovers and acquisitions of several existing opera-
tors in the Polish market:
2005: Sand mine Szczakowa S.A. taken over by German company PCC A.G.; PCC Rail 
Szczakowa S.A. founded; the PCC Rail S.A. Group established.
2007: On 1 January, PTKiGK Zabrze and KP Kuźnica Warężyńska form PTK Holding 
S.A.; at the end of the year, PCC Rail acquires PTKiGK Rybnik.
2009: In July, Deutsche Bahn takes over PCC Logistics Group, and in September, PTK 
Holding Group. PCC Rail renamed DB Schenker Rail Polska S.A.
2011: On 3 January, DB Schenker Rail Polska S.A. Group finalizes several further 
acquisitions: DB Schenker Rail Rybnik S.A., DB Schenker Rail Zabrze S.A., Trawipol 
Sp. z o.o., NZTK Sp. z o.o., Energoport Sp. z o.o. and PUT Trans-PAK Sp. z o.o. In 
November, it also acquires DB Schenker Rail Coaltran.
ITL Polska Sp. 
z o.o. 
(SNCF-Geo-
dis)
2007 2006: ITL Polska Sp. z o.o. founded as a daughter company of the German rail operator 
ITL International GmbH.
2008: The French national railways SNCF Fret acquire a 75% stake in the company. 
2010: SNCF acquires the remaining 25% shares in ITL International GmbH, incorpo-
rating the German operator in the capital Group Captrain Deutschland owned by the 
French SNCF-Geodis Group.
On 1 June 2012, ITL Polska Sp. z o.o. commences activity as part of the Captrain 
Group.
Private operators
CTL Logistics 
Group
2003 2001: Maczki Bór sand mine incorporated into CTL Logistics SA Group (as CTL Mac-
zki-Bór).
2004: CTL Rail commences operations.
2006: The Group’s other specialized rail operators started up: CTL Train, CTL Express, 
X-Train, and CTL Reggio.
2007: The private equity fund Bridgepoint becomes CTL Logistics Group’s strategic 
partner and shareholder.
Lotos Kolej 2003 Created in 2002 from Rafineria Gdańska’s Rail Transport Company, the former mana-
ger of the oil company’s railway sidings. 
The undertaking becomes part of the LOTOS Group.
Freightliner 
PL
2005 It is part of the UK’s Freightliner Group.
Pol-Miedź 
Trans Sp. z 
o.o.
2003 Set up in 1997 as Pol-Miedź Trans Sp. z o.o. by separating transport services from the 
copper production process, the company forms part of the KGHM Polska Miedź S.A. 
Group, which includes 33 entities.
Rail Polska 2003 Wholly owned by Rail World Inc. – a rail operator and investment company headquar-
tered in Chicago.
1999: The foundation of Rail Polska.
2003: The acquisition of the Wrocław based ZEC TRANS Sp. z o.o. and PPUH Kolex 
Sp. z o. o. from Włosienica, Poland.
ORLEN Kol-
Trans 
Sp. z o.o.
2004 ORLEN KolTrans Sp. z o.o. is part of the business Group built around Poland’s largest 
oil company – Polski Koncern Naftowy ORLEN S.A. [PKN Orlen].
2006: PKN Orlen’s Shipping Division incorporated into ORLEN KolTrans.
 Table 1. Ownership changes in Poland’s rail freight sector
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Sp. z o.o., PKP Informatyka Sp. z o.o.), and businesses 
operating outside the rail transport sector. Eight of the 
PKP Group companies and a PKP Cargo subsidiary cal-
led Przedsiębiorstwo Spedycyjne Trade Trans Sp. z o.o. are 
included in the Group’s consolidated financial statements 
(PKP S.A., 2014). In its role as the parent company, PKP 
S.A. supervises and coordinates the activities of the PKP 
Group companies, establishing business objectives for 
each of them and ensuring that these objectives are met. 
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PKP Cargo is Poland’s rail freight market leader and the 
second biggest (after the DB Schenker Group) rail freight 
operator in the EU. On October 30, 2013, PKP Cargo 
was floated on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, becoming 
the first stock-listed rail freight operator in the EU. Its 
stock market debut was at the same time the largest initial 
public offering on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2013. 
The offering, as a result of which PKP S.A. sold almost 
50% of the shares in PKP Cargo, totaled in PLN 1.42 
billion and made PKP Cargo stock a significant part of the 
mWIG40 index. PKP S.A. remains its major shareholder 
(with 33.01% of the shares). During the anniversary stock 
exchange session of October 30, the company’s share price 
rose by 3.64% to PLN 79.70, which means that its market 
valuation had increased by PLN 524 million relative to the 
IPO price of PLN 68 (PKP Cargo, 2014). 
PKP Cargo is part of the PKP Cargo Logistics Group. 
The Group comprises companies such as Cargosped, a 
subsidiary responsible for intermodal transport operations, 
PS Trade Trans, providing national and international rail 
freight forwarding services, and PKP CARGOTABOR – 
one of the world’s largest freight car maintenance com-
panies (Figure 2). The Group also owns and runs logistic 
centers and terminals situated at key locations across the 
country, including land and sea borders.
PKP Cargo operates its own freight cargo services in 
Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Hungary and Lithuania. Its 
strategy is aimed at becoming an integrated logistics ope-
rator with an international outreach. In 2013, PKP Cargo 
Group moved 114 million tonnes of freight and generated 
revenues of PLN 4.8 million and a net profit of PLN 65 
million. As far as PKP Cargo’s expansion plans are concer-
ned, the company is engaged in talks on potential acquisi-
tions in Poland and abroad. The targets include AWT, the 
largest private rail operator in the Czech Republic, CTL 
Logistics, and Pol-Miedź Trans in Poland. PKP Cargo is 
also considering a joint acquisition, with Węglokoks, of 
Port Gdański Eksploatacja (PKP Cargo, 2014). 
Another example of a corporate group implementing 
a Europe-wide strategy is the CTL Logistics Group. The 
company started rail forwarding operations, chiefly invol-
ving chemicals, in the early 1990s. Its rapid growth over 
the following several years resulted in the formation of the 
CTL Group (Chem Trans Logistic Holding Polska S.A.). 
In mid-2004, the enterprise was renamed CTL Logistics 
to emphasize its goal of transforming into a comprehensive 
logistics platform providing rail transportation, forwar-
ding and transshipment services alongside a complete 
range of services related to rolling stock maintenance and 
leasing, sidings management, and customs clearance. In 
2004 CTL Logistics, together with the German company 
RAIL4CHEM, inaugurated the first private international 
rail freight service between Poland and Germany.
The CTL Logistics Group’s business model has evolved 
from specialization in services targeted at specific indus-
tries toward diversification of activities and pan-European 
expansion (including areas beyond Poland’s eastern bor-
der). As of the end of 2014, the Group is composed of 
eleven companies, whose subsidiaries are present in six 
countries: Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, the 
Slovak Republic, Belarus, and Ukraine. In line with its 
motto, “Connecting Europe,” CTL Logistics pursues a 
strategy that is at the same time regional and European. 
Its long-term strategic objective is to achieve a leadership 
position among private rail operators in the EU markets. 
3. Conclusion
Groups of companies deliver more than 90% of trans-
port performance in the rail freight market in Poland, 
which is what differentiates Poland’s market from those 
of other European countries. Also, the Polish incumbent 
company’s public stock offering remains unprecedented 
throughout Europe. 
An analysis of the transformations that occurred in the 
Polish rail freight market in the last decade reveals that the 
evolution of corporate groups was driven by acquisitions, 
mergers, and ownership consolidations. Holding struc-
tures mostly emerged as a result of, or in connection with, 
the following processes: the EU-wide rail transport libera-
lization, the rail freight market opening in Poland, the res-
tructuring of the PKP S.A. Group, Poland’s accession into 
the EU, the robust growth of  Poland’s logistics services 
market, the consolidation processes in the transport and 
logistics market, and a number of recent staffing changes 
in rail companies’ executive management. 
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1. Introduction
The process of transition to a market economy in for-
mer socialist economies has been executed in different mo-
dels and time frames. Even when transition models were 
similar, each Central- and East European country had its 
own way and pace of reforming its national economy, 
including the ownership structure. Corporate governance 
in all transition economies faces the problem that inter-
nal control mechanisms in companies are often stronger 
than external (stock market, reputation) (Aluchna, 2013). 
Together with insufficient investor protection and inef-
fective legal system this prevents investors to enter more 
willingly to emerging markets. Countries originating from 
the former Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia were in 
this specific position, since the ownership and economic 
model practiced in federal Yugoslavia were not based ex-
clusively on the soviet-modelled state-owned planned eco-
nomy, but as a semi-market economy with unique “public 
ownership” over the majority of enterprises and some ins-
titutions. Natural resources and infrastructure were state 
owned, but their exploitation and management has been 
assigned to purpose formed enterprises. Since “public 
ownership” is not recognized anymore as a legal ownership 
form in Serbia, overall water management in the country 
is assigned to public companies founded - and owned - 
by government bodies, but in daily operations they must 
cooperate with a number of other partner companies. This 
paper presents a brief overview on whether various com-
panies involved in water management in the Republic of 
Serbia form Business Group or not.
2. What are Business Groups 
Theoretical views on Business Groups and their defi-
nition vary among researches. A Business Group may be 
characterized and defined from institutional economics, 
sociological or resource based views. Leff (1978) defines 
Business Group as “a group of companies that does busi-
ness in different markets under common administrative or 
financial control”, which is in fact the definition of a mul-
tinational corporation. Powell and Smith-Doerr (2003) 
consider Business Groups as a “network of firms that regu-
larly collaborate” during longer periods of time. Khanna 
and Yishay (2007) in their research about Business Groups 
in emerging markets are pointing to the circumstances un-
der which those groups emerge, and emphasize that they 
are the answer to specific economic conditions. The reasons 
for their formation and for the directions of their evolution 
are various, depending on local circumstances. Because of 
this, Business Groups in underdeveloped economies may 
play a positive role and serve as a motor for development, 
or they can be ballast, as described by Khanna and Yishay 
as “parasites”. According to Granovetter (1994), the term 
Business Groups should be used for the intermediate level 
of binding among companies, excluding short term al-
liances as well as legally consolidated corporates.  
3. Water Management and Business Group
 In almost all countries today water is considered as a 
state owned natural resource, and the Republic of Serbia 
is no exception (Law on Waters, 2010). Serbian water 
is managed by three Public Companies (PC): “Vode 
Vojvodine” is responsible for waters in the northern 
Autonomous Province Vojvodina, “Beogradvode” for 
those in the Belgrade region and “Srbijavode” for the rest 
of water resources in the country. Although it may look 
like all three PCs are state owned institutions, they have 
different origins and different owners: “Vode Vojvodine” 
is founded and owned by the Vojvodina provincial go-
vernment, “Srbijavode” by the Serbian Government and 
Water Management Companies in Serbia: Business Group 
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A Business Group is a form of cooperation among companies legally independent from each other but connected through constant mutual interest or 
technological process, operating in more or less coordinated way. Network industries and public companies dealing with natural resources such as water 
are the logical choice for this kind of organization, but various forms of ownership structure and other constrains present in transition economies make 
their functionality uncertain. The example of Serbian water management companies acting as a specific Business Group shows the complexity of this 
issue.
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“Beogradvode” by the municipality of Belgrade. Due to 
the basic nature of water as a natural resource and inte-
raction of all flows in the country, these three PCs form 
the core of a specific Business Group, although their ju-
risdictions are territorially divided. According to Bajcetic 
(2012), water, similarly to any other natural resource, can 
be defined either as a pure public good, impure public 
good, mixed good, merit good or private good. Since 
they do not produce, distribute or sell drinking water, in 
the case of  Serbian PCs water has characteristics of all 
abovementioned goods, except the last (private good). 
Although, some authors argue that in certain situations 
water managed by a PC may have characteristics of a pri-
vately owned good: the consumer may be excluded from 
the usage of the resource, competition exists, profit can 
be made and the decision whether to provide or use the 
resource is based on market elements (price, supply and 
demand, etc) (Bajcetic, 2012).  
“Vode Vojvodine” is authorized to manage all water 
related issues in the Province, including the general use 
of water (cooperation with drinking water suppliers and 
waste water processing companies, irrigation, drainage), 
environmental and flood protection, waterways regula-
tion, etc. This PC owns various equipment and hydrologi-
cal objects such as dams, slices, locks, pump stations and 
other, but not the water per se. The most specific resource 
under “Vode Vojvodine” management is the Danube-Tisa-
Danube (DTD) hydro system made of a 929 km long 
canal network out of which 603 km are navigable. There 
are 26 gates, 17 locks and 6 pumping stations, which are 
managed directly by the PC, but DTD canal network 
serves also 30 loading and unloading locations, including 
14 cargo ports, and 180 bridges that are not owned or 
operated by “Vode Vojvodine” but other companies, both 
public and private, which should also be considered a part 
of the water management Business Group. Since Business 
Groups are understood as “collections of heterogeneous 
companies tied together by formal and informal links” 
(Aluchna, 2014), Serbian water management, construc-
tion and maintenance companies are a good example for 
this. “Vode Vojvodine” directly cooperates with a num-
ber of companies responsible for maintenance of local 
hydro systems, part of DTD canal or those located on 
the rivers Danube, Tisa, Sava and more than ten smaller 
rivers in the Province. Having in mind that DTD hydro 
system drains more than 1 million hectares in Vojvodina, 
almost 160,000 ha from Hungarian and 285,000 ha from 
Romanian territory, the number of companies that can be 
considered part of the specific Business Group is huge, but 
in this paper only companies domiciled in Serbia are taken 
into account.
The members of the Business Group formed around 
three main Serbian water management public companies 
are 23 smaller local water management companies (18 of 
them located in Vojvodina province) that are still today 
(2014) registered as “publicly owned” enterprises, although 
this form of ownership has been excluded in course of the 
constitutional changes in 2006. The main reason for this 
is the fact that minor water management companies are 
not attractive to investors due to the high operating costs, 
the surplus of employees, the long turnover period and the 
relatively low profit that can be expected. On the other 
hand, there are a number of engineering companies that 
are able to act as partners and sub-contractors to main pu-
blic water management companies, and, since it is the legal 
obligation of PCs  to contract all works using open public 
procurement procedures, private contractors are often in 
the position to offer lower prices and better conditions 
compared to over-employed and technologically outdated 
“publicly owned” enterprises. According to Granovetter 
(1994), the term Business Groups should be used for the 
intermediate level of binding among companies, excluding 
short term alliances as well as legally consolidated corpo-
rates. This is exactly the case of “Vode Vojvodine” PC and 
other hydro management and construction companies in 
Serbia, which are connected on the basis of technological 
processes and mutual interests, but without any legal ties 
or incorporating mechanisms. 
4. Conclusion
Mr. Ratan Tata of India’s Tata Group stated that the 
“conglomerate kind of model has existed to some extent 
in Japan and […] in Korea and it works well there […] 
in the Indian context it will probably continue to work 
reasonably well” (Khanna, 2012). The example of Tata 
Business Group that consists of 31 companies active in va-
rious areas, from automotive to electronics, chemical and 
hotel industry, is very different compared to the Serbian 
water management example, but this shows in how many 
different environments this form of cooperation may be 
practiced. It is doubtful whether quality corporate gover-
nance is present in group of water management compa-
nies in Serbia today, although it is clear that they form 
specific Business Group on the country’s market. There 
is a great variety of ownership structure among them: 
private companies, “publicly owned” enterprises and, as 
main stakeholders, three public companies founded and 
owned by provincial, state and municipality governments. 
Coordination between group members is very compli-
cated; however water has the characteristics of a natural 
resource: i.e. mutual interaction of all surface flows in the 
country (and regions) and the necessity for constant coor-
dinated maintenance of infrastructure such as the canal 
network, dams, slices, pumps, as well as flood protection 
activities. For this reason all entities included in the natio-
nal water management must act as a Business Group. 
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Overview
Network industries offer a highly interesting research area, 
as business operations generally need to account for both 
competition and regulation. Adequate performance is 
only reached by balancing economic efficiency and reaso-
nable profits with public interests and investment needs. 
Especially the relationship between liberalization and re-
gulation of monopolies or monopolistic bottlenecks dea-
ling with public needs creates multi-disciplinary research 
questions related to corporate governance. In particular, 
market-oriented corporate governance mechanisms might 
not perfectly work in a partly monopolistic environment.
The conference intends to bring together academics, pro-
fessionals and representatives of governments and opera-
tors. The aim is to address key issues in network industries 
arising from the intersection of regulation and competi-
tion on the one hand and corporate governance on the 
other hand.
Conference Structure
The conference on corporate governance in network in-
dustries will be held at the new campus of the WU Vienna 
University of Economics and Business in Austria on Octo-
ber 28 and 29, 2015. The conference is jointly organized by 
the Institute for Corporate Governance (WU), the Chair 
Management of Network Industries (NI, EPFL), and the 
Florence School of Regulation (EUI) supported by the 
WU Research Institute of Regulatory Economics. Accep-
ted conference papers can be submitted to a Special Issue 
of the Journal Utilities Policy. Each day of the conference 
will open with a Keynote Speech on new issues on corpo-
rate governance in network industries.
We would like to invite you to submit an extended abs-
tract or a full paper dealing with research topics, inclu-
ding but not restricted to:
• The specifics of corporate governance mecha-
nisms in infrastructure and network industries
• Economic regulation of infrastructure indus-
tries (including electricity, telecoms, gas, water and other 
infrastructure industries such as airports, postal services, 
etc.) and its relation to corporate governance
• Boundaries and overlaps between regulation and 
corporate governance for utilities and networks
• The processes of de- and re-regulation, as well 
as privatization, and their implications on the corporate 
governance of the involved firms
• Corporate governance of state-owned infrastruc-
ture firms
We would welcome both theoretical and empirical papers, 
including case study work. If you want to be considered 
for publication in the special issue, a full paper needs to be 
submitted. Each presenter will have 20 minutes to present 
followed by comments from an assigned discussant, plus 
general discussion. If you are not willing to act as an assig-
ned discussant, please let us know prior to the conference.
Extended abstracts/Papers and all other queries should be 
sent to CGNI@wu.ac.at. 
More information will be provided at www.wu.ac.at/icg/
cgni.
Important dates
Submission deadline: 31st May 2015
Notification of acceptance: 30th August 2015
Provisional program/start of registration: 2nd September 
2015
Final program and end of registration: 16th October 2015
Organizing committee and editors
Anne d’Arcy (WU)
Francisca Bremberger (WU)
Matthias Finger (EPFL NI & EUI)
Klaus Gugler (WU)
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The de- and re-regulation of the different network industries is an ongoing process at the global level. 
As this process unfolds, ever new phenomena emerge, which generally call for more, rather than less 
regulatory intervention. Yet, the question about the right mixture between market, economic, technical 
and social regulation remains wide open in all the network industries. 
The question becomes even more challenging when looking at infrastructure development in dif-
ferent regions as, at least in some of the network industries, the gap between regulatory assets in dif-
ferent countries is very wide. Most of the European countries have a long lasting story of national 
regulation and have then started to put considerable effort in harmonising their regulation at the EU 
level. Outside the EU, regulation of network industries has followed its own path, according to the 
necessities of the country or the macro-region. Despite the different stages of network industries regu-
lation, mutual learning processes might be possible and actually welcome, in the light of an ever more 
connected world. 
This 4th Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures aims at taking stock of the major 
challenges infrastructure regulation is currently facing, paying attention to the mutual understanding 
effort that the regulators have to undertake. It does so by:
• looking at the main infrastructure sectors, notably telecommunications, postal services, elec-
tricity, gas, railways, air transport, urban public transport, as well as water distribution and sani-
tation; intermodal approaches in infrastructure regulation (e.g., rail and air, road and rail, electricity 
and gas, post and telecommunications) are particularly encouraged;
• looking at infrastructure regulation from various disciplinary approaches, notably engineering, 
economics, law and political science; interdisciplinary approaches are particularly encouraged; 
• linking an academic approach to practical relevance; policy relevant research papers are again 
particularly encouraged.
Finally, we especially welcome papers that link technology and institutions in developing and emerging 
countries. Interested junior academics – advanced PhD students, PostDocs and Assistant Professors – 
along with academically minded practitioners are particularly encouraged to participate. 
Outstanding papers will have the chance to be published in the special issue of the Network Industries 
Quarterly that will be published in 2015. Furthermore, the best paper will be submitted for streamlined 
publication in the Journal Competition and Regulation in Network Industries.  
Unique Conference Format
Following the successful experience of the 3rd edition, the format of the Florence Conference on the 
Regulation of Infrastructures is unique:
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-each presenter has 45’, which includes 20’ of presentation, 10’ of qualified feedback and 15’ of discussion 
with the audience (there are only 2 papers per session, guaranteeing high quality);
-feedback will be given by senior professors associated with the Florence School of Regulation, who are 
specifically knowledgeable about the topic at hand;
-papers which will be retained for publication will receive additional feedback beyond the conference. 
Guidelines for submission: 600-1000 words structured as follows:
-title of the paper
-name of the author(s) and full address of the corresponding author (postal, phone, fax and email)
-the aim and methodology of the paper
-results obtained or expected
-a few keywords
Please find a template at this link. 
Timeline
- submission of the abstract until February 13th 2015 (word format) by email to fsr.transport@eui.eu
- notification of acceptance by February 27th 2015
- submission of the full paper by May 29th 2015; participants who fail to comply with this deadline will 
be automatically removed from the programme
Scientific Committee
• Prof. Matthias Finger (EPFL and EUI, Director of the Transport Area of FSR)
• Prof. Jean-Michel Glachant (Director of the Energy Area of FSR)
• Prof. Leigh Hancher (Director of the EU Energy Law & Policy Area)
• Prof. Xavier Labandeira (Director of the Climate Policy Research Unit of FSR)
• Prof. Pier Luigi Parcu (Director of the Communications and Media Area of FSR)
• Prof. Ignacio Pérez Arriaga (MIT, Comillas and EUI, Director of the Energy Training of FSR)
• Prof. Stéphane Saussier (IAE de Paris and FSR, Director of the Water Area of FSR)
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announcements
The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) has been created in 2004 as a partnership between the 
European University Institute (EUI) and the Council of the European Energy Regulators (CEER). Since 
then, the Florence School of Regulation has expanded from Energy regulation to Telecommunica-
tions and Media (2009), Transport (2010) and Water (2014).
The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation (FSR Transport) is concerned with the regu-
lation of all the transport modes and transport markets (including the relationship among them). It 
currently focuses on regulation and regulatory policies in railways, air transport, urban public trans-
port, intermodal transport, as well as postal and delivery services.
The aim of FSR Transport is:
• to freely discuss topics of concern to regulated firms, regulators and the European Commission 
by way of stakeholder workshops;
• to involve all the relevant stakeholders in such discussions; and
• to actively contribute to the evolution of European regulatory policy by way of research.
The core activity of FSR Transport is the organization of policy events, where representatives of the 
European Commission, regulatory authorities, operators, other stakeholders, as well as academics 
in the field meet to shape regulatory policy in matters of European transport.
The results of FSR Transport’s activities are disseminated by way of policy briefs, working papers and 
academic publications. All FSR Transport materials are open source and available on the FSR Trans-
port webpage, as they aim to involve professors, young academics and practitioners to become part 
of a unique open platform for applied research. 
To learn more visit our website: www.florence-school.eu or contact us at FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
FSR-Transport: Events 2014
Date Title
5-6 February 2015 FSR Conference: Smart Cities, Smart Regulation?
 23 February 2015 Executive Seminar on Aviation Safety (by invitation only)
9 March 2015 3rd  Florence Intermodal Forum
 20 April 2015 7th Florence Air Forum
18 May 2015 10th Florence Rail Forum
 12 June 2015 4th Florence Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures
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For more information about our activities please contact: FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
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